MaxArc Global Health Impact Platform

Identity, Access, Approval & Immutable Audit Governance

FOR GLOBAL FUND / CCM / AUTHORIZED PARTNER REVIEW ONLY
Identity governance · RBAC · Approval workflow · Separation of duties · Immutable audit · Demonstration only

Authorized access and human decision controls across every platform module.

A synthetic governance demonstration — not a production identity system, authorization server, credential store, or security certification. No real authentication, passwords, API keys, tokens, sessions, cookies, OAuth, OIDC, SAML, LDAP, MFA delivery, credential storage, or live identity-provider integration is implemented. Access requires an authorized role, valid purpose, and explicit least-privilege scope; requestors cannot approve their own requests; sensitive access requires second review; temporary access auto-expires; and every request, decision, delegation, revocation, override, and emergency event is auditable. AI is assistive only and never grants, approves, assigns, waives, activates, revokes, closes, or discloses.

You are viewing the Identity & Access Governance Dashboard — Synthetic non-identifiable demonstration data
Access-governance posture: Access requires an authorized role, a valid purpose-of-use, an approved and explicit scope, and time-bounded authorization where applicable. Permissions are least-privilege and minimum-necessary. Module access and data access are distinct. Expired, revoked, suspended, and denied access remain visible and never expose restricted information.
Separation-of-duties posture: Separation-of-duties rules keep requestors, approvers, reviewers, and auditors distinct where required. Violations remain blocked or pending, identify the violated rule, require reassignment or second review, remain auditable, and are never silently overridden.
Immutable audit posture: Audit events are append-only in this demonstration model. Historical events are not rewritten; corrections require a new linked event; deletion is not represented as an allowed control. Source-module audit records remain authoritative. This task does not implement a production cryptographic audit ledger.
Governed actors 12

Synthetic, masked

Active roles 23

Least-privilege

Permission sets 22

Minimum-necessary

Pending requests 2

Awaiting decision

Approved requests 3

Human-approved

Denied requests 2

No restricted info exposed

Blocked requests 2

SoD / policy

SoD conflicts 4

Blocked or pending

Second-review queue 4

Sensitive access

Temp access expiring 0

Auto-expires

Suspended / revoked 2

Remain visible

Privileged reviews 3

Periodic

Overdue reviews 1

Flagged

Emergency events 1

Post-reviewed

Access-review completion 50%

Reviews done

Anomalous signals 3

Human review

Audit events 7

Append-only

Audit completeness 86%

Reviewed

Evidence completeness 80%

Present

Workflow types 9

Of 9

Roles, permissions & scope

Roles are least-privilege and minimum-necessary. Module access and data access are distinct; country, facility, program, organization, and record scopes are explicit. Conflicting roles are never silently assigned.

RoleModule scopeData scope / purposeControls
Fund Disbursement Initiator
ROLE-FUND-INITIATOR
fund-accountability Country A, PRG-HIV
purpose: program-financial-operations
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-FUND-AUTHORIZER
Fund Release Authorizer
ROLE-FUND-AUTHORIZER · privileged
fund-accountability Country A, PRG-HIV
purpose: program-financial-authorization
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-FUND-INITIATOR
Warehouse Dispatcher
ROLE-WAREHOUSE-DISPATCHER
stockpile-logistics Country B, FAC-B-007
purpose: supply-chain-operations
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-WAREHOUSE-RECEIVER
Warehouse Receiver
ROLE-WAREHOUSE-RECEIVER
stockpile-logistics Country B, FAC-B-007
purpose: supply-chain-receiving
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-WAREHOUSE-DISPATCHER
Laboratory Result Preparer
ROLE-LAB-PREPARER
lab-operations Country A, DEP-LAB
purpose: laboratory-operations
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-LAB-RELEASER
Laboratory Result Releaser
ROLE-LAB-RELEASER · privileged
lab-operations Country A, DEP-LAB
purpose: laboratory-result-release
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-LAB-PREPARER
Restricted Locator Requestor
ROLE-LOCATOR-REQUESTOR
restricted-patient-locator Country A
purpose: authorized-patient-continuity
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-LOCATOR-APPROVER
Restricted Locator Disclosure Approver
ROLE-LOCATOR-APPROVER · privileged
restricted-patient-locator Country A
purpose: authorized-disclosure-review
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-LOCATOR-REQUESTOR
Asset Custodian
ROLE-ASSET-CUSTODIAN
asset-management Country B, FAC-B-007
purpose: asset-stewardship
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-ASSET-VERIFIER
Asset Verifier
ROLE-ASSET-VERIFIER
asset-management Country B, FAC-B-007
purpose: asset-verification
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-ASSET-CUSTODIAN
Program Result Submitter
ROLE-PROGRAM-SUBMITTER
program-performance Country A, PRG-TB
purpose: program-reporting
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-PROGRAM-CERTIFIER
Program Result Certifier
ROLE-PROGRAM-CERTIFIER · privileged
program-performance Country A, PRG-TB
purpose: program-certification
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-PROGRAM-SUBMITTER
AI Intelligence Case Creator
ROLE-AI-CASE-CREATOR
ai-intelligence Regional
purpose: anomaly-triage
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-AI-CASE-CLOSER
AI Intelligence Case Closer
ROLE-AI-CASE-CLOSER · privileged
ai-intelligence Regional
purpose: case-disposition
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-AI-CASE-CREATOR
Readiness Assessor
ROLE-READINESS-ASSESSOR
country-rollout Country B
purpose: readiness-assessment
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-DEPLOYMENT-AUTHORIZER
Deployment Authorizer
ROLE-DEPLOYMENT-AUTHORIZER · privileged
country-rollout Country B
purpose: deployment-authorization
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-READINESS-ASSESSOR
Evidence-Package Author
ROLE-EVIDENCE-AUTHOR
authorized-review-room Regional
purpose: evidence-package-preparation
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-EVIDENCE-APPROVER
Evidence-Package Approver
ROLE-EVIDENCE-APPROVER · privileged
authorized-review-room Regional
purpose: evidence-package-approval
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-EVIDENCE-AUTHOR
Packet Generator
ROLE-PACKET-GENERATOR
executive-review-packet Regional
purpose: packet-generation
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-PACKET-EXPORT-AUTHORIZER
Packet Export Authorizer
ROLE-PACKET-EXPORT-AUTHORIZER · privileged
executive-review-packet Regional
purpose: export-authorization
minimum-necessary
conflicts: ROLE-PACKET-GENERATOR
Independent Auditor
ROLE-AUDITOR · privileged
fund-accountability, stockpile-logistics, lab-operations, patient-continuity, restricted-patient-locator, asset-management, program-performance, ai-intelligence, country-rollout, authorized-review-room, executive-review-packet Regional
purpose: independent-audit
minimum-necessary
Funder Reviewer
ROLE-FUNDER-REVIEWER
authorized-review-room, executive-review-packet Regional
purpose: authorized-review
minimum-necessary
CCM Member
ROLE-CCM-MEMBER
authorized-review-room, executive-review-packet Country A
purpose: authorized-review
minimum-necessary

Access requests & decisions

Every request identifies requestor, purpose, requested scope, approving role, and evidence. Requestors cannot approve their own requests. Denied requests never expose restricted information. Expired, revoked, suspended, blocked, and denied access remain visible.

RequestRequestor roleRequested scopeStatus
AR-001
Initiate HIV program disbursement request
ROLE-FUND-INITIATOR
by ACT-01
fund-accountability
data: Country A, PRG-HIV
approved SoD compliant
AR-002
Self-authorize the same disbursement the requestor initiated
ROLE-FUND-AUTHORIZER
by ACT-02
fund-accountability
data: Country A, PRG-HIV
blocked SoD violation 2nd review
rule: SOD-SELF-APPROVAL
AR-003
Confirm receipt of a consignment this actor dispatched
ROLE-WAREHOUSE-DISPATCHER
by ACT-03
stockpile-logistics
data: Country B, FAC-B-007
pending SoD violation 2nd review
rule: SOD-DISPATCH-RECEIPT
AR-004
Release restricted results this actor prepared
ROLE-LAB-PREPARER
by ACT-05
lab-operations
data: Country A, DEP-LAB
blocked SoD violation 2nd review
rule: SOD-LAB-PREPARE-RELEASE
AR-005
Restricted locator disclosure for authorized continuity
ROLE-LOCATOR-REQUESTOR
by ACT-07
restricted-patient-locator
data: Country A
denied SoD compliant 2nd review
AR-006
Read-only review of an authorized evidence package
ROLE-CCM-MEMBER
by ACT-11
authorized-review-room
data: Country A
approved SoD compliant
AR-007
Elevated access to all modules with all data scopes
ROLE-FUNDER-REVIEWER
by ACT-10
fund-accountability, stockpile-logistics, lab-operations, restricted-patient-locator
data: Regional, all-records
denied SoD compliant 2nd review
AR-008
Verify the same asset held in custody by this actor
ROLE-ASSET-CUSTODIAN
by ACT-12
asset-management
data: Country B, FAC-B-007
pending SoD violation 2nd review
rule: SOD-ASSET-CUSTODY-VERIFY
AR-009
Read-only audit review across modules
ROLE-AUDITOR
by ACT-09
fund-accountability, program-performance
data: Regional
approved SoD compliant

Separation-of-duties rules

Violations remain blocked or pending, identify the violated rule, require reassignment or second review, remain auditable, and are never silently overridden.

RuleEnforcementOverride / audit
Requestor cannot approve their own access request.
SOD-SELF-APPROVAL
blocked never silently overridden
auditable · e.g. AR-002
Fund disbursement initiator cannot independently authorize release.
SOD-FUND-INIT-AUTH
blocked never silently overridden
auditable · e.g. AR-002
Procurement creator cannot independently approve procurement.
SOD-PROCUREMENT
second-review never silently overridden
auditable
Warehouse dispatcher cannot independently confirm receipt.
SOD-DISPATCH-RECEIPT
pending never silently overridden
auditable · e.g. AR-003
Laboratory result preparer cannot independently release restricted results.
SOD-LAB-PREPARE-RELEASE
blocked never silently overridden
auditable · e.g. AR-004
Restricted-patient-locator requestor cannot independently approve disclosure.
SOD-LOCATOR
second-review never silently overridden
auditable · e.g. AR-005
Asset custodian cannot independently verify the same asset where second review is required.
SOD-ASSET-CUSTODY-VERIFY
pending never silently overridden
auditable · e.g. AR-008
Program-result submitter cannot independently certify the same result.
SOD-PROGRAM-SUBMIT-CERTIFY
second-review never silently overridden
auditable
AI intelligence case creator cannot independently close the case.
SOD-AI-CREATE-CLOSE
second-review never silently overridden
auditable
Readiness assessor cannot independently authorize deployment.
SOD-READINESS-DEPLOY
second-review never silently overridden
auditable
Evidence-package author cannot independently provide final approval.
SOD-EVIDENCE-AUTHOR-APPROVE
second-review never silently overridden
auditable
Packet generator cannot independently authorize export.
SOD-PACKET-GENERATE-EXPORT
second-review never silently overridden
auditable

Approval workflows

Single, sequential, parallel, second-review, compliance, audit, emergency-post-review, expiration-review, and revocation-review workflows. Each approval record carries request, step, required role, assigned reviewer, decision, timestamp, reason, evidence, separation-of-duties status, and audit reference.

  • single (AC-001 · AR-001)
    step 1: ROLE-FUND-AUTHORIZER → approved
  • sequential (AC-002 · AR-009)
    step 1: ROLE-AUDITOR → recommended; step 2: ROLE-EVIDENCE-APPROVER → approved
  • parallel (AC-003 · AR-006)
    step 1: ROLE-CCM-MEMBER → endorsed; step 1: ROLE-EVIDENCE-APPROVER → approved
  • second-review (AC-004 · AR-002)
    step 1: ROLE-FUND-AUTHORIZER → blocked
  • compliance (AC-005 · AR-005)
    step 1: ROLE-LOCATOR-APPROVER → denied
  • audit (AC-006 · AR-009)
    step 1: ROLE-AUDITOR → reviewed
  • emergency-post-review (AC-007 · EMG-001)
    step 1: ROLE-EVIDENCE-APPROVER → post-reviewed
  • expiration-review (AC-008 · TMP-002)
    step 1: ROLE-EVIDENCE-APPROVER → expired-confirmed
  • revocation-review (AC-009 · REV-001)
    step 1: ROLE-EVIDENCE-APPROVER → revocation-confirmed

Temporary access (auto-expires)

  • TMP-001 — ACT-10 active
    expires 2026-08-15T00:00:00Z · auto-expires: yes
  • TMP-002 — ACT-11 expired
    expires 2026-06-15T00:00:00Z · auto-expires: yes

Emergency break-glass (exceptional, post-reviewed)

  • EMG-001 — Break-glass release of a time-critical laboratory result under documented exception post-reviewed
    exceptional: yes · time-limited: yes · documented: yes · audited: yes

Delegations (limited, attributable, revocable)

  • DLG-001 — ACT-08 → ACT-11 active
    limited: yes · revocable: yes · attributable: yes
  • DLG-002 — ACT-02 → ACT-01 revoked
    limited: yes · revocable: yes · attributable: yes

Access reviews (privileged & periodic)

  • REVW-001 — fund-accountability privileged access complete
    privileged · due 2026-06-01
  • REVW-002 — restricted-patient-locator approvers overdue
    privileged · due 2026-05-15
  • REVW-003 — lab-operations releasers pending
    periodic · due 2026-07-15
  • REVW-004 — executive-review-packet export authorizers complete
    privileged · due 2026-06-10

Anomalous-access signals (human review required)

  • self-approval-attempt — Actor attempted to approve their own fund request. high
    human review required: yes · autonomous action: no · open
  • conflicting-role-assignment — Assignment would place dispatch and receipt with the same actor. high
    human review required: yes · autonomous action: no · open
  • expired-access-active — Temporary access represented past its expiration — flagged for deactivation. medium
    human review required: yes · autonomous action: no · resolved
  • excessive-access-request — Request exceeded minimum-necessary scope. medium
    human review required: yes · autonomous action: no · denied
  • suspicious-emergency-access — Emergency break-glass access requires post-review confirmation. medium
    human review required: yes · autonomous action: no · post-reviewed
  • overdue-privileged-review — Privileged-access review is overdue for restricted-locator approvers. high
    human review required: yes · autonomous action: no · open

Immutable audit events (append-only)

  • AUD-001 — access-request-approved approved
    ROLE-FUND-AUTHORIZER · fund-accountability · 2026-06-20T09:12:00Z · immutable: yes
  • AUD-002 — self-approval-blocked blocked
    ROLE-FUND-AUTHORIZER · fund-accountability · 2026-06-21T10:00:00Z · immutable: yes
  • AUD-005 — disclosure-denied denied
    ROLE-LOCATOR-APPROVER · restricted-patient-locator · 2026-06-23T14:05:00Z · immutable: yes
  • AUD-011 — emergency-access-granted granted-time-limited
    ROLE-LAB-RELEASER · lab-operations · 2026-06-30T17:30:00Z · immutable: yes
  • AUD-011-C1 — audit-correction corrected correction of AUD-011
    ROLE-AUDITOR · lab-operations · 2026-07-01T09:00:00Z · immutable: yes
  • AUD-014 — access-revoked revoked
    ROLE-EVIDENCE-APPROVER · asset-management · 2026-06-18T12:00:00Z · immutable: yes
  • AUD-019 — privileged-review-overdue overdue
    ROLE-AUDITOR · restricted-patient-locator · 2026-05-16T00:00:00Z · immutable: yes

Audit events are append-only in this demonstration model; corrections require a new linked event; deletion is not represented as an allowed control; source-module audit records remain authoritative. This task does not implement a production cryptographic audit ledger.

Decisions by outcome

  • approved 3
  • blocked 2
  • pending 2
  • denied 2

Requests by module

  • fund-accountability 4
  • stockpile-logistics 2
  • lab-operations 2
  • restricted-patient-locator 2
  • authorized-review-room 1
  • asset-management 1
  • program-performance 1

Module coverage

fund-accountability stockpile-logistics lab-operations patient-continuity restricted-patient-locator asset-management program-performance ai-intelligence country-rollout authorized-review-room executive-review-packet

AI posture — assistive only, non-autonomous

AI assists with

  • detect conflicting role assignments
  • identify excessive or unusual access
  • detect expired access still represented as active
  • prioritize access reviews
  • identify missing approvals or evidence
  • detect self-approval attempts
  • identify suspicious emergency-access patterns
  • reconcile actor, role, organization, module, and scope records
  • summarize audit history for authorized reviewers
  • recommend access-review actions

AI must never

  • autonomously grant access
  • autonomously approve requests
  • autonomously assign roles
  • autonomously waive separation-of-duties rules
  • autonomously activate emergency access
  • autonomously revoke or suspend access
  • autonomously alter audit history
  • autonomously disclose restricted information
  • autonomously close access reviews
  • bypass evidence, human approval, minimum-necessary, expiration, revocation, or audit controls

AI is assistive only. It surfaces conflicts, excessive or unusual access, expired-but-active access, missing approvals or evidence, self-approval attempts, and suspicious emergency-access patterns for authorized human reviewers. Confidence is not proof; an anomaly is not a finding until a human reviews and decides. AI never makes access-control decisions.

Runtime boundary & linkage